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Digest: Manta Management Corp. v. City of San Bernardino
Mike M. Khalilpour

Opinion by Chin, J., expressing the unanimous view of the Court.
Issue
Can a city be liable under Title 42 of the United States Code section
1983 1 for judicially enforcing a zoning ordinance by obtaining a stay and
preliminary injunction where the stay is later dissolved and the ordinance
under which the preliminary injunction is granted is later declared
unconstitutional?
Facts
In 1994, Manta Management Corp. ("Manta") established a comedy
nightclub in the city of San Bernardino ("the City"). 2 Shortly thereafter,
Manta converted the club to an adult cabaret in violation of the City's
ordinance limiting the location of adult businesses. 3
The City sued Manta in state court seeking to enjoin the adult business
as a public nuisance and as a violation of the City's zoning ordinance. 4
Manta contended that the ordinance violated the United States and
California Constitutions "as applied" for being "unduly restrictive." 5 The
trial court found the zoning restrictions constitutional and granted the
City's preliminary injunction, noting the City's likelihood of prevailing on
the merits. 6 Manta appealed and shortly thereafter filed a cross-complaint
seeking monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ("Section
1983"). 7
In 1996, the trial court dissolved the preliminary injunction and
declared the City's ordinance an infringement of Manta's First Amendment
right to speech "as applied." 8 The City appealed and was granted its
request to stay the injunction pending the appeal. 9 The Court of Appeal
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dismissed Manta's appeal from the order granting the preliminary
injunction. 10 In 1999, the Court of Appeal lifted its stay, and the California
Supreme Court denied review. 11
In 2000, the issue of the City's liability under Section 1983 was
brought to the trial court, which ruled that the acts "precipitating the
preliminary injunction and stay were an effort to enforce an
unconstitutional zoning ordinance." 12 The trial court held that such actions
constituted a basis for Section 1983 liability; however, the court did not
find the city's ordinance itself a basis for Section 1983 liability. 13 Manta
was awarded $1.4 million in damages. 14
The City appealed, contending that liability was improper under
Section 1983, given that they had sought redress through the courts. 15 The
Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that "the city's act of obtaining an
injunction to enforce an unconstitutional ordinance" violated the First
Amendment within the meaning of Section 1983 and that a "city is liable
for damages under section 1983 if it chooses to enforce an unconstitutional
ordinance by means of a preliminary injunction." 16 The Court of Appeal
also held that "good faith" reliance on the trial court's issuance of the
preliminary injunction would not provide immunity. 17
Analysis
The California Supreme Court stated that the purpose of Section 1983
was to provide "compensation to those deprived of their federal rights by
state actors"' but that it was "not itself a source of substantive rights, but
merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred." 18
The Court outlined the elements necessary for a prima facie showing
to prevail on a Section 1983 claim for monetary damages: "(1) whether
plaintiffs harm was caused by a [federal] constitutional violation, and (2)
if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation." 19 The Court then
continued to explain that liability depends namely upon "( 1) the rules
governing culpability and responsibility, including principles of causation
and the rule against respondeat superior liability; (2) whether individual or
governmental liability is at issue; and (3) the available immunities from
liability." 20 The Court found relevant only the causation issue of how
10

!d.

II

fd.

12

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

13
14

15
16
17
18

19
20

at 162-63 (internal quotations omitted).
at 163.

(internal quotations omitted).
(internal quotations omitted).
at 163-64 (internal quotations omitted).
(internal quotations omitted).

Manta Management Corp. v. City ofSan Bernardino

2008]

235

related the City's acts or omissions were in bringing about the alleged
injury. 21
The Court narrowly addressed the question of whether, assuming
arguendo that Manta's First Amendment rights were violated, the "act of
seeking an injunction to enforce" and the subsequent act of "filing a
petition for writ of supersedeas to obtain a stay" caused harm. 22 The Court
quickly disposed of the immunity issue, as the City was not seeking
immunity from liability but was contending that their acts of gaining the
stay and preliminary injunction did not cause the alleged injury. 23
Relying on out-of-state and federal case law dealing with Section
1983 litigation, as well as traditional tort concepts of causation, the Court
The Court agreed that, absent
agreed with other circuits. 24
misrepresentation or pressure from the state actor, a court's exercise of
"independent judgment" would break the causal link and be considered an
intervening event, thereby preventing the first actor from being liable for
harm which an "antecedent wrongful act was a substantial factor in
bringing about. " 25
In viewing the causation principle in non-Section 1983 litigation, the
Court noted that California appellate courts have found that the exercise of
"independent judgment by a court constitutes an independent superseding
cause."26 The only exception to the intervening cause principle was when
the party seeking an injunction or stay pending an appeal "either misled or
pressured the court. " 27
Holding
The Court held that a court's intervening exercise of independent
judgment breaks the chain of causation for purposes of Section 1983
liability; however, material misrepresentations to the trial court would
prevent the breaking ofthe chain ofcausation. 28
Legal Significance
This decision extends traditional tort concepts of causation to the
realities of Section 1983 litigation. This allows state actors to judicially
enforce their laws in a good faith belief that they are constitutional and
valid at the time. This decision also benefits potential plaintiffs by
providing an exception to the traditional causation principles, when and if
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material misrepresentations and pressure are used by the state actors to
achieve judicial enforcement.

